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Abstract
The usufruct mortgage has received little attention from economists. This pa-
per develops and analyzes a theoretical framework in which the borrower, who
mortgages out, and the lender, who mortgages in, a parcel of land reach their
decisions in a risky environment when credit and land markets function imper-
fectly. It yields some results concerning what conditions and factors govern the
decision to contract in the ﬁrst place and, subsequently, when and whether to
repay or agree to a sale. These ﬁndings underpin and structure an empirical in-
vestigation of such contracting in upland Orissa, based on a panel survey of 279
households over the period 2000-2013. Almost 20 percent had contracts in 2013,
the borrowers’ chief need being to marry oﬀ a daughter, followed by coping with
serious illness and bad harvests. The sums involved were quite large, indicat-
ing that such contracts expand households’ opportunities beyond those oﬀered
by standard informal and formal credit transactions. Mortgage contracting also
appears frequently to lead to the full transfer of ownership rights from relatively
land-rich to land-poor households.
Keywords: usufructuary mortgage, agrarian contracts, Orissa
JEL Classiﬁcation: D13, D14, D86, Q12, Q15
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1 Introduction
In close-knit societies, where markets may be far from perfect, transactions in goods and
services are often bundled together in so-called interlinked contracts (Basu, 1983; Bell,
1988). This practice may be a response to market failures, as the contracting parties
seek ways of expanding the total surplus. Then again it may be a way for powerful
agents to extract more surplus from weaker ones. Various labor-credit-product-land
interlinkages are documented in the literature (Bardhan and Rudra, 1978; Bardhan,
1980). A laborer may get low-interest loans in the lean season against work below the
market wage during the peak season (Mukherjee and Ray, 1995). A cultivator may get
a production loan at a low or even zero interest rate against the sale of output below
the ruling market price (Bell and Srinivasan, 1989). Landowners may subsidize the
inputs applied by their sharecroppers, knowing that they will get some of the resulting
increase in production (Braverman and Stiglitz, 1982).
In this paper we study usufruct mortgages, a contractual form that has received
but little attention – from economists at least –, despite the fairly prominent place it
sometimes ﬁnds in India’s rural economy.1 The owner of a parcel of land borrows a
sum of money, and in exchange, transfers to the creditor all rights to its use and the
resulting income until such time as the former repays the entire sum borrowed. The
owner keeps the title deed, and thus the unrestricted option to recover the said rights
when his ﬁnancial circumstances permit. The lender may even lease the parcel back to
the borrower under ﬁxed-rent or sharecropping terms. The borrower’s alternative is to
take a normal loan and pay interest at regular intervals until repayment is complete.
The lender may, in this case, rent in the land in question, perhaps even using the
interest payments to meet the rent in a book-keeping transaction. In eﬀect, the two
parties have then de-linked the two contracts, paying the standard interest and rental
1Perrott (1909) provides an interesting discussion of informal credit at the beginning of the 20th
century. More recent contributions are Shibli (1993) and the indirect discussion in Swaminathan
(1991), where it is considered as just one of many sources of credit.
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rates.
Why, then, do we observe these interlinked usufruct mortgage contracts? An impor-
tant beneﬁt from the borrower’s point of view is that he is free to decide when to repay.
But this option may also be available, at least to a degree, in standard loan contracts.
The borrower also keeps the title document, which may already have been used as
collateral to secure a formal loan. The other chief beneﬁt arises from the fact that
the sum involved is typically quite large, such as would be needed to deal with a very
damaging shock or heavy unavoidable expenditure. Such a sum may not be obtainable
as a standard loan, especially if intended to ﬁnance marriage or cope with a bout of
serious illness or poor harvest. To obtain such a contract, however, the borrower must
have available ‘excess’ land in relation to what is considered necessary, in some sense,
to meet the family’s essential needs.
For his part, the lender may be keen to cultivate a larger holding; but the rental
market may be thin, and the land purchase market even thinner. Excess family labor
in relation to the family’s current holding not only makes mortgaging in attractive,
but it may also provide the means to put together the amount necessary to make a
satisfactory oﬀer. It must be kept in mind that these households are usually relatively
poor, as they do not normally own much land. Buying the land outright at once
can therefore lie beyond their grasp, and thus make mortgaging in a good second-
best solution. This option may be linked to an opportunistic motive: if the borrower
experiences another negative shock, then the lender may expect to buy the land at a
low price at some point in the future.
The object of this paper is, ﬁrst, to develop and analyze a theoretical model of
mortgage contracting in a risky environment, and then to apply it empirically in an
investigation of households’ behavior in upland Orissa, part of a very extensive semi-
arid tract that is socially and economically quite backward. The data stem from a
series of survey rounds, which started in 2001 and continued with two short breaks
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until the end of 2004. There followed a long pause until a single round was conducted
in 2010. The most recent two rounds covered the calendar year 2013. The original
sample comprised 240 households, 8 drawn from each of 30 villages themselves drawn
from spatial clusters. Over the course of time, many households stayed intact, but
others split, dissolved or migrated permanently. Of the original households, 216 were
traced and interviewed in 2013. Joining them were another 59 households generated
by the splitting of households in the interim, and four others added by the survey
team that conducted the round in 2010, yielding a total sample of 279 households in
the closing round. The market was quite active: 51 households had extant mortgage
contracts in 2013, with both sides of the transaction almost equally represented.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The model is set out and developed in Section
2, with separate treatments of the borrower’s and lender’s decisions in Sections 2.1
and 2.2, respectively, an analysis of the eﬀects of variations in non-random factors in
Section 2.3, and a discussion of market equilibrium in Section 2.4. To complete the
theoretical analysis, Section 3 deals with the possibility that the lender will, at some
point, acquire ownership of the mortgaged parcel, which involves a step beyond enjoying
the user rights indeﬁnitely because the borrower never repays. Section 4 summarizes
these ﬁndings in a form designed to structure and support the empirical analysis.
Introduced by a brief account of the surveys and the sample, Section 5 provides, ﬁrst,
a descriptive analysis of the incidence and duration of contracts, as well as what sort
of households contract, and second, in Section 5.2, a preliminary examination of the
hypotheses, paying particular attention to households’ motives and the adverse shocks
they suﬀer. Section 6 complements the latter sub-section with an econometric analysis
of the households’ contractual choices and whether these led, in the course of time,
to a redistribution of ownership holdings in favor of a particular group of households.
The main conclusions are drawn together brieﬂy in Section 7.
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2 The Model
A risk-averse household endowed with labour and possibly land and other assets allo-
cates them in production so as to produce a stream of income, which varies stochas-
tically not only with the vagaries of the weather, pests and market prices, but also
with the family members’ state of health. Bouts of illness can put the workers out of
action for some length of time, and any member’s ailment may well require outlays on
medical treatment. The same holds for the family’s draught animals. In the worst case,
a family member may die: the corresponding part of the family’s total endowment of
labour is lost, the funerary rites must be observed and the attendant, socially necessary
expenditures incurred. Draught animals, too, are mortal, and theft is not altogether
rare. If lost, an animal must be replaced or draught-power services hired. Both involve
extra outlays relative to the status quo ante.
Marriages, especially of daughters, are also expensive aﬀairs if families observe social
custom, as they almost invariably do. That the event will occur is taken for granted,
but the timing depends on the search for a suitable partner and subsequent negotia-
tions, which can fail (Bailey, 1957). Here too, then, there is an element of uncertainty
where the level of extraordinary, unavoidable expenditures in any particular period is
concerned.
For simplicity, deﬁne income to be net of outlays on marriage and funerary rites, as
well as those on the treatment of sick persons and animals. Income is derived from two
sources. First, there are the plots of land to which the household has both title and
full usufructuary rights, including those to rent out part or all of the said holding. To
these must be added any further plots that have been mortgaged in with like rights.
The sum of the two will be called the usufructuary holding. Second, there are all other
sources, including, in particular, labour. Let λht denote the total area of household h’s
ownership holdings, μht (≤ λht) the net area it mortgages out, and κht its non-land
endowment. Land unencumbered by an existing mortgage contract is necessary if the
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household is to mortgage out, and μht < 0 indicates that land is mortgaged in. The
size of the usufructuary holding in period t is λht − μht. Households that own no land
may therefore cultivate by lending to acquire usufructuary rights through mortgaging
in. They turn out to be an important sub-group in the data.
Let the variate Yht denote the household’s total (net) income in period t, and let
it be i.i.d. over all periods, so that Yht is stationary and serially independent. Given
the endowments λht and κht, and the mortgaged area μht, let Yht have the continuous,
diﬀerentiable distribution function Fh(yht; κht, λht, μht), whose support [y
1
h, y
2
h] depends,
in general, on (κht, λht, μht). The following assumption is very weak.
Assumption 1. Distributions associated with larger usufructuary holdings and non-
land endowments ﬁrst-order stochastically dominate those associated with smaller ones.
Formally, Fh(yht; κht, λht, μht) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates Fh(yht; κ
′
ht, λ
′
ht, μ
′
ht)
if (κht, λht − μht) ≥ (κht, λ′ht − μ′ht) .
Let the household’s preferences over lotteries conform to the expected utility hypoth-
esis, with the strictly concave von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(yht). The
expected utility of the lottery Yht is
Ω(Yht) =
y2h∫
y1h
u(yht) dFh(yht; ·) ≡ Ω(Yh), (1)
where the assumptions on Yht imply Ω(Yht) = Ω(Yh) ∀ t. The present value of the
stream of expected utilities arising from {Yht}t=∞t=0 for any ﬁxed (κh, λh, μh) is
V (Yh) ≡
∞∑
t=0
δth · Ω(Yh) = Ω(Yh)/(1− δh), (2)
where δh is the household’s discount factor.
The state wherein a household never engages in this form of contracting (μht =
0 ∀t ≥ 0) is an important reference case. Such a household obtains V (Yh(μ = 0)),
whereby Ω(Yh(μ = 0)) > Ω(Yh(μh > 0)) in virtue of Assumption 1. The shocks that
time brings may, however, make a mortgage contract attractive. In any period, social
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custom and severe unexpected setbacks may force some households to seek funds to
cover them. Some of those households that are not so currently burdened may have
suﬃcient funds to lend, in which event, there will be a basis for trade. These two
groups are indexed by i and j respectively, and their options will be taken up in turn.
2.1 Borrowers
Households may be able, from time to time, to put a little aside to deal with minor
contingencies; but such a reserve will not normally serve to deal with the problem
that arises when net income turns out to be very low in relation to essential current
expenditures. One option is for the household’s members simply to tighten their belts,
but this fall-back may involve austerity to the point of real hunger and deprivation.
Alternatively, the household may try to cope by taking out a loan on conventional
terms, perhaps secured by some form of collateral if it has any acceptable to lenders.
Yet such a loan may not be on oﬀer, or if available, its terms unacceptably onerous.
A third option, if the household owns land and can ﬁnd a contractual partner with
enough funds, is to mortgage out a parcel of its land under the following terms: in
exchange for the sum mi, it gives up the right to cultivate a parcel of area μi until it has
repaid the whole of mi to the creditor who provides it. In the interim, the creditor will
enjoy the usufructuary rights instead of interest. For its part, the borrowing household
enjoys not only the immediate relief of having additional funds in the amount mi, but
also the option of reclaiming these rights whenever it is able to scrape together that
sum at some point in the future, a task that will usually require a stroke of good
luck, especially with an endowment eﬀectively reduced by the mortgaged parcel in the
interim.2
2Renting out a parcel in the usual way will also yield income, but it will not really ﬁt the bill. So-
called ‘english’ rental contracts, in which a ﬁxed rent is paid in advance are rather rare in developing
countries, and the payment is limited to the coming season alone, so its receipt is unlikely to cover a
big expenditure. Sharecropping contracts are the usual form, though ﬁxed rents payable after harvest
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Suppose household i enters into such a contract at time t = k, having drawn yik(μ =
0). (In what follows, the index i and the corresponding endowments κi and λi are
suppressed whenever no ambiguity would arise, and a zero in parentheses indicates no
mortgaging activity.) If the household repays the loan in period t = l (≥ k + 1), the
contract will yield a stream of net income from period t = k onwards that arises from
the process
{yk(0) +m, Yk+1(μ), Yk+2(μ), . . . , Yl(μ)−m, Yl+1(0), . . .}, μ ≤ λk,
whereby the realization yl(μ) in period l must be suﬃciently good to make the concur-
rent sacriﬁce of m worthwhile.
We proceed by backward induction. Let the household have an outstanding contract
at t = τ . It draws yτ . If it pays oﬀ m, it will consume yτ −m in the current period and
resume the stationary stream yielded by F (y; 0) thereafter. If it decides to continue the
mortgage arrangement, it will consume yτ in the current period and obtain a draw from
the distribution F (y;μ) in the next period, at the close of which it will face anew the
decision of whether to continue. Denote by yr the smallest realisation of yτ at which
the household is indiﬀerent between these two courses of action. Since the setting is a
stationary one, yr will be the critical value of yt in all periods. The value, as assessed
at t = τ , of the stream of expected utilities yielded by continuing with the mortgage,
given this choice of yr, is u(yτ) + δSτ , where the value of the stream from t = τ + 1
onwards is
Sτ =
yr∫
y1(μ)
u(y)dF (y;μ) +
y2(μ)∫
yr
u(y −m)dF (y;μ) + δ(1− πi)Sτ+1 + πiδV (Y (0))
and πi ≡ 1−F (yr;μ) is the probability that a loan outstanding at the close of the last
period will be repaid at the close of the current period. Since the setting is stationary,
– albeit converted into sharecropping terms in the event of a generally poor crop – are also observed;
they both suﬀer the salient, twin drawbacks that payment is made at the end of the season and its
level is stochastic.
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Sτ = Sτ+1, so that
Sτ =
⎡
⎢⎣
yr∫
y1(μ)
u(y)dF (y;μ) +
y2(μ)∫
yr
u(y −m)dF (y;μ) + πiδV (Y (0))
⎤
⎥⎦
/
(1−δ(1−πi)) ∀τ.
(3)
The alternative course of action is to repay m out of yτ , which yields u(yτ −m) +
δV (Y (0)). Recalling (2), the household will therefore be indiﬀerent between repaying
and continuing when the following condition holds:
u(yr)− u(yr −m) = δ · Ω(Y (0))− Γ
1− δ(1− πi) ≡ δQ
m
i (m,μ), (4)
where
Γ ≡
yr∫
y1(μ)
u(y)dF (y;μ) +
y2(μ)∫
yr
u(y −m)dF (y;μ) (5)
is the expected utility of the lottery Yt(μ) with the trigger value y
r inducing repayment
of m. Eq.(4) implicitly deﬁnes yr as a function of δ and (κ, λ, μ), which generate the
distributions F (y; 0) and F (y;μ). The l.h.s. is the ‘cost’ of belt-tightening in order to
repay out of current net income. The r.h.s is the gain from regaining F (y; 0) in the
next period; its value is independent of t.
It is important to note that given m,μ, δ, F (y; 0) and F (y;μ), there may exist no
yr ∈ [y1(μ), y2(μ)] that satisﬁes (4). If the only solution is smaller than y1(μ), then
repayment will follow with certainty in the next period. This will come about if the loan
is suﬃciently small in relation to the productivity of the plot that is mortgaged to obtain
it, though the borrower’s rationality places limits on how disproportionately large the
latter can be, both magnitudes being known ex ante. If, at the other extreme, there is
a unique yr > y2(μ), then repayment will never occur. As we shall see in Section 3, this
does not necessarily imply that the borrower sells the plot for the sum m, though if m,
as the price, is high enough, that will be the right option. The remaining possibility is
that there exists a yr ∈ [y1(μ), y2(μ)] that satisﬁes (4).
Proposition 1. The trigger value yr is unique for any oﬀer (m,μ). It is increasing in
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m, κ and λ, and decreasing in μ.
Proof : see Appendix.
The conditions for yr ∈ [y1(μ), y2(μ)] are also established therein. The larger is m,
the greater becomes the attraction of waiting for a good realisation of net income, and
in the limit, of eﬀectively selling the plot in question for m by choosing yr > y2(μ)
and never repaying. The larger is μ, the greater is the desire to get the plot back
by repaying as soon as possible. Larger endowments imply lower probabilities of very
poor realisations of net income, and hence make it less pressing to get back the plot in
question.
Having established the critical value of yt for repayment decisions that are time-
consistent, the next step is to determine whether the said contract is attractive at the
outset, at t = k. Given the draw yk from F (y; 0), the household will be indiﬀerent
between accepting the contract and making do with yk if, and only if,
u(yk +m)− u(yk) = δQmi . (6)
where the r.h.s. now represents the cost that is incurred by exchanging the superior
distribution F (y; 0) for F (y;μ) until at least the trigger value yr is realised, and thus
m repaid, in some future period. Recalling that Qmi is independent of both t and the
draw yk, it follows from the strict concavity of u that given (m,μ), there is a unique
value of yk satisfying (6), which is denoted by y
m ∀k.
The level of m and the trigger values ym and yr are closely related. From (4) and
(6), we have u(ym +m)− u(ym) = u(yr)− u(yr −m), which yields at once
Proposition 2. The trigger value for repayment, yr, exceeds that for entering into the
contract, ym, by the amount of the loan: ym +m = yr.
Mortgaging out is a way of smoothing the adverse shock expressed by a low realisation
of yk. Its (net) advantage over simply belt-tightening is
Δmi ≡ [u(yk +m)− u(yk)]− δQmi (m,μ). (7)
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The strict concavity of u implies that the relief provided by a loan of given size m,
as expressed by [u(yk + m) − u(yk)], is increasing and convex as yk falls, that is, as
the magnitude of the adverse shock increases. It is seen from (7) that if u(y1(0) +
m) − u(y1(0)) < δQmi , then the mortgage contract will be rejected in favour of belt-
tightening; and if u(y2(0) +m)− u(y2(0)) > δQmi , the contract will be accepted. The
remaining possibility is that there exists an ym ∈ [y1(0), y2(0)], and the decision then
follows according as the draw yk from F (y; 0) exceeds or falls short of y
m.
The eﬀect of a small increase in m on Δmi , for a given plot μ, is
∂Δmi
∂m
= [u′(yk +m)− u′(yk)]− δ · ∂Q
m
i
∂m
< 0,
where the negative sign follows from the strict concavity of u, Proposition 1 and
∂Qmi /∂y
r > 0 (see the Appendix for a proof of the latter claim).
There remains the important question of how changes in the endowment λ inﬂuence
p(ym, λ) = F (ym;μ = 0), the probability that the household will accept the oﬀer (m,μ).
We have
∂p
∂λ
= f(ym)
∂ym
∂λ
+
⎛
⎜⎝−f(y1)∂y1
∂λ
+
y2(λ)∫
y1(λ)
∂f(y)
∂λ
dy
⎞
⎟⎠ , (8)
where f(y) is the density function of y. The expression in parentheses is negative in
virtue of Assumption 1. Against this, however, the trigger value ym is increasing in λ,
in virtue of Propositions 1 and 2. The same holds for changes in κ. Whether households
with larger endowments are more or less likely to accept a given oﬀer in the event of an
adverse shock cannot be determined without recourse to much stronger assumptions.
What happens in Orissa will be examined in the empirical sections below.
2.2 Lenders
Suppose household j enjoys such a good draw yjk in period k that it considers lending
the sum mj in order to mortgage in a suitable plot of land if the opportunity arises. If
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it concludes such a contract, it will enjoy an augmented stream of net income with the
distribution function Fj(yjt;μ < 0) until the loan is repaid in full. Fj(yjt;μ < 0) ﬁrst-
order stochastically dominates Fj(yjt;μ = 0) , and the advantage it confers will depend,
inter alia, on the degree of complementarity in production of j’s existing endowments
and additional land. Cultivation is not the only source of risk, however; for the timing
of repayment, and hence the length of the lease, is for the borrower to decide, and
this is a random variable. Recalling Section 2.1, the probability that the loan will be
repaid in any period after t = k is constant, at πi . Other than the plot associated with
Fj(yjt;μ < 0), this is the borrower’s sole characteristic that matters to the lender, but
it is certainly important. We assume that the lender is able to estimate πi exactly.
Proceeding as in Section 2.1, the value of the resulting stream of expected utilities
yielded by the contract, as assessed at t = k, is u(yjk −mj) + δjSjk, where
Sjk =
πiΩ(Yj(μ < 0) +mj) + (1− πi)Ω(Yj(μ < 0)) + πiVj(Yj(0))
1− δj(1− πi) (9)
and Ω(Yjt(μ < 0)) = Ω(Yj(μ < 0)) ∀t. It should be noted how the borrower’s choice
of πi weights the various branches of the lender’s outcome-tree in which repayment
occurs, whereby πi is evaluated at mi = mj .
The alternative is simply to consume the windfall at once in period k, which yields
a stream whose present value is u(yjk) + δjVj(Yj(0)) . Noting (2), it is seen that the
lender will be indiﬀerent between these two courses of action if, and only if,
u(yjk)− u(yjk −mj) = δj [πiΩ(Yj(μ < 0) +mj) + (1− πi)Ω(Yj(μ < 0))− Ω(Yj(0))]
1− δj(1− πi) ,
(10)
where the r.h.s. is independent of t. It is proved in the Appendix that, for each mj ,
there is a unique value of yjk satisfying (10), which is denoted by y
m
j ∀k. The expression
in brackets in the numerator on the r.h.s. is decreasing in each of the endowments κj
and λj in virtue of Assumption 1 and the strict concavity of u. Inspection of the l.h.s.
then reveals that ymj is increasing in κj and λj .
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Analogously to (7), the net advantage of oﬀering the loan is
Δmj ≡ [u(yjk−mj)−u(yjk)]+
δj [πiΩ(Yj(μ < 0) +mj) + (1− πi)Ω(Yj(μ < 0))− Ω(Yj(0))]
1− δj(1− πi) .
(11)
A very favourable draw yjk will evidently incline the household to lend, and perhaps
a considerable sum, since u is strictly concave. For any given plot of land, an increase
inmj involves a direct cost, as represented by the term [u(yjk−mj)−u(yjk)], but it also
yields pay-oﬀs in the future. First, when repayment does occur – if it ever does –, yjt is
very likely to be lower than the favourable realisation yjk that induced the household
to lend in the ﬁrst place. Secondly, and more importantly, an increase in mj will induce
the borrower to choose a higher trigger value of yr, and so a lower value of πi. Not only
does this lower the eﬀective discount rate for outcomes in which repayment is made,
but it also increases the probability of enjoying the augmented process {Yt(μ < 0)} for
more periods. While these particular advantages are unlikely, by themselves, to oﬀset
the direct cost in full, they will certainly temper it.
It remains to establish how changes in the endowments aﬀect the attractiveness of
lending m for μ. Analogously to pi(y
m
i , λi) = F (y
m
i ;μ = 0) for a borrower to accept the
oﬀer (m,μ), we have pj(y
m
j , λj) = 1−F (ymj ;μ = 0) is the probability that lender j will
make it. Analogously to (8), the fact that the trigger value ymj is increasing in each of
the endowments makes the signs of the derivatives ∂pj/∂λj and ∂pj/∂κj ambiguous.
2.3 Borrowers and lenders: non-random factors
The foregoing analysis concentrates on borrowing and lending decisions arising from
shocks to net income, with the distinction between the distributions Fi and Fj involving,
in particular, μ < 0 and μ > 0, respectively. Indeed, a household might borrow in need
at some point, repay later, and then, after enjoying a particularly good draw, seek to
lend, all the time with the same reference process Yt(0). Yet systematic factors are
also at work in inﬂuencing whether a household borrows or lends. Let these express
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themselves as variations in net income such that each realisation of the variate Yt is
augmented by the parametric amount ai or aj as appropriate. We now examine how
changes therein aﬀect the attractiveness of borrowing and lending using the vehicle of
a usufructuary mortgage.
Starting with putative borrowers, (4) becomes, on introducing the suﬃx i,
u(yr + ai)− u(yr + ai −m) = δ · Ω(Yi(0) + ai)− Γ(ai)
1− δ(1− πi) ≡ δQ
m
i (ai). (12)
Diﬀerentiating totally and rearranging terms, it is shown in the Appendix that yr is
increasing in ai if, and only if,
δi(Γ
′ − Ω′(Yi(0) + ai)) > (1− δi(1− π))[u′(yr + ai −m)− u′(yr + ai)]. (13)
This condition states that the diﬀerence between the expected marginal utility of the
lottery Γ and that of Yi(0) exceeds the diﬀerence between the marginal utility of net
income evaluated at yr with repayment and that without, the diﬀerences weighted
by the discount factors δi and (1 − δi(1 − π)), respectively. The l.h.s. will be large,
cet. par., if the plot mortgaged out is large, so that Yt(μ = 0) is much superior to Γ,
which relates to Yt(μ > 0). The r.h.s. depends on the curvature of u over the interval
(yr + ai −m, yr + ai) and the discount factor adjusted for repayment. It is seen that
the expressions on both sides of condition (13) attain a maximum when yr = y1. This
observation leads to the following result.
Proposition 4. The trigger value yr is increasing in ai if
δi[Ω
′(Y (μ > 0) + ai −m)− Ω′(Y (μ > 0) + ai)] > [u′(y1 + ai −m)− u′(y1 + ai)]
and u′′′ > 0, that is, there is a preference for positively skewed distributions.
Proof : see Appendix.
Turning to the net advantage of borrowing over belt-tightening, (7) becomes
Δmi ≡ [u(yik +m+ ai)− u(yik + ai)]− δiQmi (ai). (14)
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The expression in brackets on the r.h.s. of (14) is decreasing in ai, since u is strictly
concave. It becomes arbitrarily close to zero as ai becomes arbitrarily large; the same
holds for Qmi (ai). Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. ai, we obtain
∂Δmi
∂ai
= [u′(yik +mi + ai)− u′(yik + ai)]− δi ·
(
∂Qmi (ai)
∂ai
+
∂Qmi (ai)
∂yr
· ∂y
r
∂ai
)
, (15)
where
∂Qmi (ai)
∂ai
=
Ω′(Y (μ = 0) + ai)−
yr∫
y1(μ)
u′(y + ai)dF (y;μ)−
y2(μ)∫
yr
u′(y + ai −mi)dF (y;μ)
1− δi(1− πi) < 0
in virtue of the fact that F (y; 0) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F (y;μ > 0), and
∂Qmi (ai)
∂yr
=
[δiQ
m
i (ai) + u(y
r + ai)− u(yr + ai −mi)] · ∂F (yr + ai;μ)/∂ai
1− δi(1− πi) > 0.
Proposition 4 establishes suﬃcient conditions for yr to be increasing in ai ; but the sign
of ∂Qmi (ai)/∂a renders that of ∂Δ
m
i /∂ai ambiguous. On balance, however, it is very
likely that households that enjoy a large certain component of net income will resort
to belt-tightening in the face of a bad draw yk.
Putative lenders are concerned with
Δmj ≡ [u(yjk + aj −mj)− u(yjk + aj)]
+
δj[Ω(Yj(μ) +mj + aj) + (1− πi)Ω(Yj(μ) + aj)− (Ω(Yj(0)) + aj)]
1− δj(1− πi) , (16)
where μ < 0. The ﬁrst expression in brackets on the r.h.s is negative and goes to zero
as aj becomes arbitrarily large. The second expression is positive. Diﬀerentiating w.r.t
aj, we have
∂Δmj
∂aj
= [u′(yjk + aj −mj)− u′(yjk + aj)]
+
δj[Ω
′(Y (μ) +mj + aj) + (1− πi)Ω′(Y (μ) + aj)− (Ω′(Y (0)) + aj)]
1− δj(1− πi) .(17)
The ﬁrst term on the r.h.s is positive, since u is strictly concave. Assumption 1 and the
strict concavity of u imply that the second term is negative. It is seen that the strict
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concavity of u implies that lending in exchange for usufructuary rights becomes more
attractive relative to immediate consumption as aj increases provided m is suﬃciently
large. Those households that have sources of income that are rather substantial and
fairly sure, such as government or regular employment, are more likely to oﬀer loans
of this kind.
2.4 Equilibrium
Households interested in a mortgage contract, whether as borrowers or lenders, must
ﬁnd suitable partners, and this is almost surely a more taxing task than closing a
standard credit contract. In the nature of things, the pool of potential partners is
largely conﬁned to the village itself or those in the near neighbourhood. This implies,
in turn, that these households’ net incomes are positively correlated. Even so, sickness,
deaths, marriages and the like will normally produce enough contemporaneous variation
to yield a real chance of ﬁnding a potential partner, as the data themselves suggest.
Household i, having suﬀered a bad draw, seeks a sum in the neighbourhood ofmi and
is prepared to mortgage out a particular plot in order to obtain it. Most landowning
households have a few plots, but each is registered and is therefore legally indivisible,
which is what counts for mortgage contracts. Household i therefore has only very few
options in this regard. Household j, which has just enjoyed a good draw, contemplates
lending mj or some such amount. Villagers know much about their neighbours’ busi-
ness, so there is a good chance that i and j will come to discuss the possibility of a
deal. For i, the oﬀer of mj must lie suﬃciently close to mi. For j, the essential point is
whether the plot on oﬀer will yield a suﬃciently attractive Fj(yjt;μ < 0) and its likely
duration, which depends on the agreed level of m and the size of the plot. If mi and mj
lie somewhat far apart and i possesses more than one plot, the parties can consider the
other options where the particular plots are concerned. There will also be some room
for varying the amount of the loan, but this is almost surely limited by i’s immediate
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needs. At all events, there will be scope for bargaining.
If i and j fail to agree, they have the option of seeking out other prospective part-
ners, though the respective pools of potential lenders and borrowers, respectively, will
normally be quite small. Failing success there, i must attempt to get a standard loan
or, worse still, resort to belt-tightening. For j, there is the choice between padding out
the savings account and making merry in the present. These ‘outside’ options will play
the usual role when i and j bargain over the precise terms of a usufructuary mortgage
contract.
3 Selling as a Further Option
The possibility that the borrower is certain never to repay, as expressed by the rational
choice of a trigger value yr exceeding y2i , emerged in Section 2.1. We now pursue this
further by introducing a formal sale, with a change of land title, as an explicit option.
It is important here to distinguish between simply leaving the usufructuary rights with
the lender and formally assigning him or her full ownership rights. For possession of
the land title usually confers other advantages, the plot’s value as a form of collateral
being most prominent among them. If an unencumbered plot is sold outright for the
amount v, then in a stationary environment, the same plot when already mortgaged for
the amount m should command the additional amount v −m in negotiations leading
to the lender obtaining the title.
3.1 Borrowers
The argument proceeds as in Section 2. Household i draws yτ at t = τ and, having
mortgaged a plot for m earlier, is confronted with the decision of whether to repay,
continue for another period, or sell for the additional amount v −m and so settle for
{Yt(λi − μ)} thereafter. We conjecture that each of these choices is associated with a
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sub-interval of [y1i (μ), y
2
i (μ)], whereby the union of the sub-intervals covers the whole
support, but one or two the sub-intervals may be null. If a sub-interval is null, the
corresponding choice will never be made. Intuition suggests that selling will occur, if
at all, only for suﬃciently bad draws (or very large sums v −m), repayment only for
suﬃciently good ones, and continuing for intermediate values. We therefore deﬁne
Γs ≡
ys∫
y1i (μ)
u(yit + v−m)dFi(yit;μ) +
yr∫
ys
u(yit)dFi(yit;μ) +
y2i (μ)∫
yr
u(yit −m)dFi(yit;μ),
(18)
noting that one or two of the sub-intervals [y1i (μ), y
s], [ys, yr] and [yr, y2i (μ)] may be
null, where μ ∈ (0, λi]. The analogue of Sτ is
Στ =
Γs + δ[πri V (Yi(0)) + π
s
iV (Yi(μ))]
1− δi(1− πr − πs) ≡ Σ ∀τ, (19)
where πri =
y2i (μ)∫
yr
dFi(yit;μ) and π
s
i =
ys∫
y1i (μ)
dFi(yit;μ).
The value of continuing is u(yiτ ) + δΣ. The value of repaying, and so reclaiming
Fi(yit; 0), is u(yiτ −m)+δV (Yi(0)). The borrower will be indiﬀerent between these two
courses of action if, and only if,
u(yiτ)− u(yiτ −m) = δ · Ω(Yi(0)) + δπ
s[V (Yi(0))− V (Yi(μ))]− Γs
1− δi(1− πr − πs) . (20)
It should be noted that the r.h.s. depends on ys as well as yr; for if the choice is to
continue, then the option of selling will be open in the next period. The corresponding
condition for the choice between selling and continuing is
u(yiτ + v −m)− u(yiτ) = δ · Γ
s + δπr[V (Yi(0))− V (Yi(μ))]− Ω(Yi(μ))
1− δi(1− πr − πs) . (21)
That between selling and repayment is
u(yiτ + v −m)− u(yiτ −m) = δ[V (Yi(0))− V (Yi(μ))] . (22)
Given (m, v, δ, Fi(yit; 0), Fi(yit;μ)), there is a unique value of yiτ that satisﬁes this last
condition, though it need not lie in [y1i (μ), y
2
i (μ)]. Whether continuing with the contract
is better or worse than selling or repaying at yiτ is an open question.
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It will be useful to start by deriving conditions under which selling will never be
chosen; for the setting then reduces to that analysed in Section 2. (The suﬃx i may
now be dropped, since what follows concerns only the borrower, who can block any
attempt by the lender to force a sale or repayment.) Suppose, therefore, that πs = 0
and the corresponding contribution of selling to Γs is also zero. Recalling (5), (21)
yields the following condition that continuing will be (weakly) preferred to selling:
u(yτ + v −m)− u(yτ) ≤ δ · δπ
r[V (Y (0))− V (Y (μ))] + Γ− Ω(Y (μ))
1− δ(1− πr) .
Since u is strictly concave, the l.h.s. attains a minimum at yτ = y
1(μ). Hence, if
u(y1(μ) + v −m)− u(y1(μ)) ≤ δ · δπ
r[V (Y (0))− V (Y (μ))] + Γ− Ω(Y (μ))
1− δ(1− πr) , (23)
selling will indeed never be chosen over continuing, and a unique value of yr will trigger
the decision to repay, if at all. Denote this value of yr by yr(c)
Now suppose that condition (23) is just violated at yτ = y
1(μ) and that yr(c) is not in
the immediate neighbourhood of y1(μ). Then, by continuity, the gain from selling over
continuing will be small and there will exist a ys corresponding to yr(c) that is close to
y1(μ). It further follows that there exists a pair (ys, yr) close to (y1(μ), yr(c)) such that
the borrower is indiﬀerent between selling and continuing, and prefers both to repaying.
From (22), it is seen that this conﬁguration will hold only if u(yτ+v−m)−u(yτ−m) >
δ[V (Y (0))−V (Y (μ))]. This involves relatively large values of m and v−m, and a plot
that is not so productive as to involve a big diﬀerence between V (Y (0)) and V (Y (μ)).
It is shown in the Appendix that ys and yr move in opposite directions where condi-
tion (20) is concerned. Hence, as condition (23) is more strongly violated, both πr and
πs will increase, and the probability of continuing correspondingly reduced. Indeed, it
is possible that there exists a yτ ∈ (y1(μ), y2(μ)) such that condition (22) holds: the
borrower sells for all worse draws and repays for all better ones. This conﬁguration is
most likely to hold when the additional sum v−m is suﬃciently large and repaying m
is not too onerous.
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4 Empirical Modelling
To summarize Sections 2 and 3, borrowers and lenders have stochastic incomes that
depend on the assets whose usufructuary rights they control. The lender’s usufructuary
landholding will increase through the mortgage contract, the borrower’s will decline.
Thus for the borrower, the immediate beneﬁt of the loan must be purchased at the cost
of an inferior distribution function of income in the future. In the model, the borrower
considers taking up a loan when experiencing a negative income shock, whereas the
lender manages to scrape together the loan thanks to a positive income shock. The
conclusion of a mortgage contract will not, therefore, be a very common event, since
a match is needed among neighbors. (The borrower’s plot of land cannot be too far
from the lender’s house if the latter is to be in a position to utilize it.) Repayment will
take place, in the model, when the borrower gets a suﬃciently strong positive shock.
Full transfer of property rights – an outright sale – will happen if the borrower suﬀers
another suﬃciently serious negative shock.
Based on these predictions, we can formulate a set of empirical hypotheses, all ceteris
paribus.
• Larger endowments (of land and human capital) reduce the need to borrow to
ﬁnance any given outlay, and hence the need to mortgage out.
• Households with relatively few assets are more likely to borrow, and hence to
mortgage out; but they must own land in order to mortgage out.
• Successive negative income shocks will lead, ﬁrst, to mortgaging out, and then
to a transfer of ownership.
• A household needs a positive shock to become a lender.
• Those with little or no land are more likely to be lenders.
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We now elaborate somewhat on both parties’ motives and actions, leading to a set of
more reﬁned hypotheses.
The lender will ﬁnance the loan either from own savings, perhaps from work outside
the village, or by taking a loan himself. In both cases, the informal credit market is
available as the outside option. He can either lend some of his earnings, or he can
repay an outstanding informal loan, or not take up a new one. Similarly, he may, in
principle, either rent (or sharecrop) in the parcel of land. So the act of mortgaging in
(and lending) is particular, in the sense that he has to come up with a relatively large
amount of money up front. Given the relatively high interest rates in the informal
loan market, he will probably do this by saving, rather than taking a loan. So the
implication is that the lender, at some point in time, gets a relatively large amount
of money which is invested in this way. This can be a planned event: for example,
the family may spend the lean season as laborers in an urban area. We thus expect
the following ﬁndings: (H:La), lenders (who mortgage in land) have small (or no)
landholdings, in keeping with Proposition 3 ; and (H:Lb), they had a relatively large
income just prior to closing the mortgage contract.
An alternative possibility is that lenders already have large land-holdings and have
an opportunistic motivation for mortgaging in land, namely, the hope that the borrower
will be unable to repay the loan. In this event, they will have the option of oﬀering to
buy the land – at a low price. As discussed above, there seems to be some evidence
in the data for this kind of land accumulation. But as we shall see below, the lenders
do not own much land at the outset; so they may well be opportunistic, but are not
normally wealthy. Mortgage contracts may, in fact, work as a mechanism to redistribute
land away from households with large ownership holdings.
Those who mortgage out, for their part, also decline the outside option. In choosing
this contract, they may be motivated by possessing more land than they are able or
willing to cultivate themselves, whether because of lack of labor or the availability of
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better income-earning possibilities for family members. But if so, it appears that a
standard sharecropping or ﬁxed rent contract would be the better option. A more
likely motive, therefore, is the need for a large sum of money, with the possession of
land satisfying only a necessary condition for getting it. If so, why do they choose
this type of loan, instead of using the land title as collateral to obtain a bank loan
and keeping the user rights? The bank may refuse to give (additional) loans for non-
productive purposes; and standard informal loans carry very high interest rates. If,
therefore, mortgaging out is the last resort, we should expect to ﬁnd the following:
(H:Ba), borrowers have relatively large land-holdings; (H:Bb), borrowers have existing
loans; and (H:Bc), borrowers have an acute need for (even more) money.
5 The Data
The original sample comprised a total of 240 households in upland Orissa, with 8
households drawn from each of 24 villages in Balangir District and a further 6 villages
in Kalahandi District.3 The survey work involved the following rounds: several rounds
during 2001-2004, covering most seasons in the period kharif 2000 through kharif 2004;
a single round in 2010 covering kharif 2009, this time with a shorter questionnaire;
and another in 2013, once more with a long questionnaire, with a follow-up in 2014,
including equally extensive interviews with trading partner households and covering
the calendar year 2013. In 2013, we found 216 of the original households. Many of
them had split since the original rounds, and we interviewed all 59 splits that we found.
For the split households, we try to avoid double-counting, particularly of land-holdings.
For some parts of the analysis, we keep only the core household, which will have the
largest landholding and whose head was normally the eldest son in the original rounds.
3For a description of the region, the villages and the survey design, see van Dillen (2008).
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5.1 The incidence and duration of contracts
Of the 279 households in the 2013 round,4 50 (18%) are landless. Twenty-one of the
latter farm, with a total of 35 plots of land under cultivation (median holding one acre,
mean 1.6 acres); the other 29 do not. Twelve landowning households do not cultivate,
so there are 238 (229+21−12) cultivating households. Landowning households cultivate
a total of 538 plots, 408 of which are owned. Fifty of all owned plots are cultivated
by others, 32 of which are contracted under usufruct mortgages. These 32 plots (35
acres in all) are part of the total of 26 mortgaged-out contracts, which are held by 24
households.
Seventy-two of the 573 (35 + 538) plots under cultivation are owned by others.
Again, the usufruct mortgage is the most common arrangement: 33 plots (totalling 37
acres) are mortgaged in by 29 households (26 from the original sample5). The second
most common contractual type is sharecropping, while pure ﬁxed-rent contracts are
rather few in number (six plots leased in and three out). Overall, there is more leasing
in, mortgaging and sharecropping alike, than out. This is to be expected even in a
fairly large random rural sample, as some landowners live in towns.
There are 59 (26 + 33) extant mortgage contracts in all, involving 51 households,
of which 48 belong to the original sample,6 with at least one of the said 48 present
in 21 of the 30 villages (see Tables 1 and 2). In this group of 21 villages, the median
and (rounded) mean number of contracts are both 3 (59/21 = 2.8); the median and
(rounded) mean number of households is holding at least one contract is 2 (48/21 =
2.3). The distributions are shown in Table 1. Since the sample size is only 8 households
per village, an average of two households having such a contract is not a small number,
4Four new households were added to the original sample in the 2010 round, so that the 2013 round
comprised the 216 originals found in 2013, the 59 splits and the said 4.
5In the ﬁnal sample, we end up with 25, since a split household that had a mortgage-in contract
in 2013 is not that split of the original household with the largest landholding in 2013.
6There are 47 in the ﬁnal sample, see above.
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and it points to a rather active market in this kind of transaction.
This still invites the question, why are no contracts observed in almost one-third of
the villages surveyed? One might suspect that this has something to do with location
and commercialization: whereas conditions in remote villages might favor mortgages,
they may have disappeared in centrally located ones. However, inspection of the spatial
network and distances indicates that this is not the case. Kendumundi village, for
example, is nearby the town of Titlagarh, and has two households that mortgage out
land. One may argue that these households mortgage out precisely because they have
urban occupations; but if so, then someone else (presumably a neighbor) must be
willing to mortgage in land, and thus lend to a fellow villager with an urban job.
(Tables 1 and 2 about here.)
The duration of such contracts is of central interest, as is their frequency over time.
Sixteen of the above-mentioned 48 households in the original sample having a contract
in 2013 also had extant contracts at some stage during the early period from kharif
2000 to kharif 2004 inclusive. The reported starting dates of contracts indicates how
quickly they are repaid. In 2013, this date was reported for 57 out of the 59 contracts.
The mean date was 2010, the median was 2011, and the earliest date was 2001, with
only four loans taken up in 2004 or earlier. Extant contracts in 2013 having already
lasted an average of 3 years, one might hazard the guess that loans are repaid, on
average, after about 6 years, but the true value depends on the actual (stochastic)
process. In the rounds covering the period 2000-2004, both the median and mean
starting years were 2001. Most of the contracts seem to have been recorded already
in the ﬁrst 2001 round, which canvassed both seasons of the agricultural year 2000-01.
Among those contracts, the median starting year was 2000 and the mean 1999, which
seems to point to a shorter period until repayment, on average, at that time. Only
half of the 2001 loans were recorded as repaid in 2004, but this may be due to gaps in
information on repayment in the ﬁnal round. The data convey the general impression
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that people mortgage the land for some years, and in some cases it changes ownership.
5.2 The hypotheses: a preliminary examination
Table 3 reports summary statistics of ownership holdings for the three subgroups de-
ﬁned by households’ usufruct contractual status in 2013, together with 95-percent
conﬁdence intervals and signiﬁcance levels for comparisons of the means of contracting
and non-contracting groups.7 Two households mortgage both in and out, and some
households have multiple contractual partners, so the numbers of observations in the
table do not add up to 279. For completeness, we also report the statistics for those
linked households that have mortgage contracts with households in our primary sam-
ple, that is, for those contractual partners not belonging to our sample whom we were
able to identity and interview, though this group is not the focus of the present paper.
(Table 3 about here)
Starting with the original sample of 279 households, we use the 223 that have no
mortgage contract as the reference group. As can be seen from Table 3, those that
mortgage in land own less land on average, which is why they mortgage in, while those
that mortgage out own more, which enables them to mortgage out: indeed, there is no
overlap between the conﬁdence intervals for the respective means of 1.4 acres and 3.4
acres. There are similar ﬁndings for the linked samples, i.e., those that have mortgage
contracts with the original sample, except that those mortgaging out have even more
land. This is not surprising, since households with more land are more likely to have
multiple partners and thus have a larger probability of contracting with any randomly
selected household. We thus have support for hypotheses H:La and H:Ba. This follows
7With only 30 clusters, the use of clustered standard errors has pitfalls. We report the larger
standard error of the two, which in most cases is the clustered one, throughout the paper. In this
table, the non-clustered standard error is larger for the two small mortgage-out samples, where there
are, respectively, 18 (in 13 clusters) and 19 (in 10 clusters) observations, so the clustered standard
errors are probably biased.
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almost by construction: one must own land to be able to mortgage out, and those
lacking land of their own may wish to mortgage in. It is, however, a ﬁnding with a
twist, for it also implies that the land-poor lend money to the land-rich.
Returning to the possible motives of the land-rich to borrow from land-poor neighbors
in exchange for such user rights, there is, in principle, the alternative of using the land
title as collateral to secure a bank loan. One stratagem is to use the land as collateral
twice, ﬁrst, by depositing the title with the bank as collateral for a formal loan, and
then transferring the user rights to the lending household to get an informal one. There
is some evidence that points to such behavior. The 25 households that mortgage out
have a total of 61 loans (with a median size of Rs.10,000) for which full details about
the lender are available; all 25 must have at least one loan, and 17 of them reported
having more than one. Of the remaining 254 households, 82 have no loans and 91 have
more than one. Borrowers who mortgage out land have more loans than borrowers
who do not, in the sense that the null of homogeneity of the distributions (0 + 8, 17)
and (82 + 81, 91) is decisively rejected (χ2 = 9.930, χ20.01(1) = 6.635). This indicates
some support for hypothesis H:Bb, that is, the usufruct mortgage is only one of many
available options to which those mortgaging out resort. Borrowers who mortgage out
also take out larger loans – the median is Rs.40,000, but only Rs.18,000 for the others
(again, among those who have any loans at all).
The type of lender is known for 26 of the 32 usufruct mortgage-out loans. As ex-
pected, all are informal lenders: 16 loans come from relatives, friends or neighbors,
seven from moneylenders, two from landlords and one from a trader. The 35 additional
loans taken by the same borrowers come from more diverse lenders, similar to the other
borrowers. Where purpose is concerned, the usufruct loans are over-represented when
it comes to medical expenses and a daughter’s marriage, but when all loans taken by
these borrowers are examined together, the medical loans are not over-represented.
Thus, only loans for a daughter’s marriage are over-represented among borrowers who
mortgage out land. Yet only 9 of the 26 usufruct loans have marriage as the declared
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purpose. If we construe marriage as a sudden need for credit, then there is some
support for hypothesis H:Bc.
This brings us to the role of negative shocks, information on which is available only
for the period 2000-2004. Six of the 26 households that mortgaged out (and thus took
out the associated loan) reported no shocks at all. Of the other 20, 17 reported that the
mortgage was linked to marriage, seven had health problems (the same proportion as
other households), and 12 experienced bad weather (again similar to other households).
Thus, these 20 households suﬀered, on average, about two misfortunes over the period
in question. Among the 22 households that mortgaged in land (and thus granted loans),
fully 13 reported no shocks at all. There were no marriages (just 3 in the remaining
sample). Seven of the nine that did report suﬀering a shock had health problems, and
only four reported bad weather (note that this group of 22 had less land). In the whole
sample, a total of 22 marriages are reported, and 17 of these households mortgaged
out land. We conclude that land is frequently mortgaged out to ﬁnance a daughter’s
marriage, but also that other adverse shocks play a role in forcing this option.
In what sense, however, can marriage be interpreted as a shock? One may argue that
whereas a marriage is very likely to happen, its timing is uncertain. The family must
ﬁnd an appropriate groom, followed by the additional complication that, according to
tradition, there are auspicious dates for marriage. While contemplating these tasks,
there are two possible strategies to raise the funds. One can invest in assets that can
be sold at the right time: gold and cattle are readily tradable, land less so. Or one can
wait and then borrow – potentially through a usufructuary mortgage – when the time
does come. But why is there this close link between mortgage and marriage? Marriage
entails a large, one-time cost, and though there may be other large outlays during the
lifetime of a family, marriage is still the most frequent such event in village economies.
Thus the high correlation between marriage and usufruct mortgage contracts may just
reﬂect the fact that marriage is an almost unavoidable rite of passage, and does not
necessarily imply that mortgaging out is linked only, and then potentially by social
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custom, to marriage. There is, moreover, the mitigating eﬀect that when the daughter
leaves the household, it may need less land, if only for a while, which in turn makes
mortgaging out more attractive.
6 Mortgages and Land Accumulation
We now turn to possibility that lending in order to mortgage in is an indirect means
of accumulating land. We do not have direct information on this, but any household
that mortgaged in land in the early period and owned more land in the closing period
may be a candidate. Among the 22 panel households that mortgaged in land during
the ﬁrst rounds, 11 had accumulated one acre or more by the close, whereas among
the 194 that constitute the rest of the original panel sample of 216 households, only
44 (not even a quarter) managed to do likewise. Indeed, the null of homogeneity of
the distributions (11, 11) and (150, 44) for the two groups is rejected with a test of
size 0.01 (χ2 = 7.770, χ20.01(1) = 6.635). The mean accumulations are −0.06 and 0.52
acres, with robust standard errors of 0.158 and 0.300, respectively; the diﬀerence of
0.58 acres is signiﬁcant with a test of size 0.06. To complete the picture of those that
had mortgaged in, four lost and 13 gained land in the interim. Ten were landless in
2001, and six of them had land in 2013. The normal gain was one acre.
It is less straightforward to compare declines in land holdings among those that
mortgaged out, since the splitting of households – and of the original holding among
brothers – is not a rare event, so any observed decline may result from a combination
of causes. Among the 26 panel households that reported mortgaging out in the early
period, 11 had lost one acre or more by the close, while among the remaining 190,
44 had done likewise. Once more, the null of the homogeneity of the distributions
(15, 11) and (146, 44) is rejected at conventional levels (χ2 = 4.419, χ20.05(1) = 3.84).
To complete the picture for those mortgaging out, 10 gained and 14 lost land. The
median holding was 4 acres in 2001, and the median holding for the said 14 dropped
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from 5 to 1 acres. All 26 still owned land in 2013, the median having fallen to 2.8 acres.
So from both sides of the transaction it appears that a mortgage contract may end up
as a transfer of ownership, probably at a very good price for the ‘buyer’, depending on
whether any further payments are made.
If this is the case, then we would expect to ﬁnd that the land-poor lenders have good
non-farm incomes, while the land-rich borrowers have particularly low incomes, or high
costs. An examination of non-farm incomes during the three ﬁrst seasons canvassed
(kharif 2000 through kharif 2001) reveals that the 10 households that mortgaged out
during the period 2000-04 and lost one acre or more up to 2013 had lower incomes in
those three seasons than other groups. The middle seven of this group of 10 had lower
non-farm incomes in 2000-01 than the 12 households that mortgaged in early on and
had accumulated one acre of land or more by the close. If, however, we compare all
those which mortgaged out with all those which mortgaged in, we ﬁnd no diﬀerence.
This pattern is consistent with mortgaging out being chieﬂy motivated by pressing and
substantial ﬁnancial need, and for relatively poor people with more land but limited
non-farm income, it is also a potential way to for them lose land over time.
We will now test more systematically the idea that mortgage transactions indeed
operated so as to redistribute landownership in the manner described above. Since a
household’s initial contractual status should aﬀect its subsequent (net) accumulation
of land, this needs to be investigated as a ﬁrst step. To do this, we employ a regression
framework, using information on the initial conditions and state variables reported in
the 2001 interviews. All extant mortgages reported during the three seasons in question
are included. We then use the 2013 data to measure households’ subsequent accumu-
lation of land. Excluding two outliers,8 both the median and the mean landholding are
the same, respectively, in 2001 and 2013. For the sample as a whole, therefore, there
is no land accumulation. Thus households bought, sold and divided land, but without
8The 99-percentile for landownership in 2001 is at 12 acres. Two households had, respectively, 22
and 30 acres in 2001, and lost, respectively, 16 and 27 acres between 2001 to 2013.
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altering the central measures of the distribution.
6.1 Econometric analysis
We have the following latent function:
zi = z(land ownership, family labor, education, caste) + ui.
The probability of mortgaging out we may write as P (mortgage out) = P (zi > K1),
and the probability of mortgaging in as P (mortgage out) = P (zi ≤ K0). The ﬁrst
speciﬁcation involves estimating the two equations separately using OLS. This implic-
itly means that the group of observations formed by mortgage-out together with no
mortgage is the combined control for mortgage-in. An alternative is to estimate the
two equations jointly using a multinomial logit model, with no mortgage as the control.
We report marginal eﬀects, so that they can be compared to the OLS ﬁndings. Finally,
we assume that the two equations are the same, but with K0 < K1, which means that
we estimate an ordered probit model. Again the marginal eﬀects are compared to no
mortgage. The ordered probit model implicitly assumes that the marginal eﬀects have
the same size, but opposite signs.
As a preliminary to discussing the ﬁndings, we summarize what the analysis of
the preceding sections leads us to expect. Larger endowments (land owned, labor,
education) induce a lower probability of borrowing (mortgaging out). That is to say,
as land owned decreases, then cet. per. the probability of mortgaging out increases.
This cannot continue without limit, however; for owning some land is a necessary
condition for the action of oﬀering to mortgage it. Hence, if the size of the holding is
suﬃciently small and the response function is continuous, the probability of mortgaging
out must be decreasing in that endowment. Conversely, for suﬃciently small ownership
holdings, culminating in landless households, the probability of mortgaging in will be
increasing therein. To sum up, there should be an inverse-U shaped eﬀect of own land
on mortgaging out and a U-shaped eﬀect of own land on mortgaging in. Family labor
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and education will increase (decrease) the probability of mortgaging in (out); and caste
may shift preferences for mortgaging (both in and out). Finally, mortgaging in may
lead to accumulation of land.
The results for the mortgage decision are reported in Table 4. The ﬁndings are robust
across the diﬀerent econometric speciﬁcations and conform largely to expectations. For
mortgaging out, the relation is concave and ﬁrst increasing (see columns 2 and 5), with
an implied turning point at about 9 acres,9 close to the top end of landholdings. For
mortgaging in, the function is convex and ﬁrst decreasing (see columns 1 and 4), though
the estimated coeﬃcients are much less precise. The OLS estimates, the more precise
of the two, imply a turning point of 11.5 acres. The ordered probit estimates (see
column 3) are consistent with these ﬁndings, with an implied turning point of just over
10 acres. These turning points are not so precisely estimated as to warrant strong
assertions that households with more than 10 acres or so are less likely to mortgage
out; for only 12 of the whole sample owned 6 acres or more. Of the four owning 8.75
acres or more, one mortgaged out; but just one of the eight owning between 6 and 8.75
acres did so. We conclude that over the actual distribution of ownership holdings, and
all else being equal, households with small to modest holdings are likely to mortgage
out to neighbors with even smaller ones.
In contrast to the predictions, family size has no eﬀect on these decisions, even when
controlling for the number of dependants and working-age members. Human capital,
as measured by educational attainment, however, appears to increase the probability of
mortgaging in. This implies some support for the hypothesis of an opportunistic motive
for mortgaging, if some education is needed to make and execute a long-term plan of
acquiring full ownership. The ﬁnding that tribal people are less active on both sides
of the market – particularly in mortgaging out – is consistent with received wisdom
about social customs in the matter of land relations in upland Orissa.
9Both coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at conventional levels in the logit speciﬁcation. The turning point
is 0.070/(2× 0.004) = 8.75.
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(Table 4 about here)
To close, we investigate whether mortgaging in land in 2001 appears to have been a
stepping stone towards accumulating land. To test this, we estimate land ownership
in 2013 as a function of landownership in 2001 and the area of land mortgaged in
during 2001, adding the area mortgaged out for completeness (see Table 5). As a
preliminary, it should be remarked that the descriptive statistics discussed above are
richer in content than the following regression analysis. For a parametric relation
between initial and closing landholdings in the latter only summarizes the changes in
land distributions discussed above. Recall, in particular, that the land distribution
within the panel stays basically the same: individual households just switch positions.
Thus, we cannot interpret the estimated parameter for initial land (acres01), whose
value is smaller than one, as indicating that there will be growing concentration of
land ownership, which would indeed happen if the estimated function described the
transitions of a single household. The estimated value only indicates that land in fact
tends to stay in the family over time, but that there is also some trade in land.
Controlling for initial land ownership, the coeﬃcient on the area mortgaged in dur-
ing the early period is positive, quite large and statistically highly signiﬁcant, which
supports the hypothesis that mortgaging in is a long step on the way to accumulating
land. This is the main ﬁnding, and it is robust to the introduction of other regressors.
It is also reassuring that the coeﬃcients on all three land variables vary relatively little
across the speciﬁcations in Table 5. It should be mentioned that controlling for (admin-
istrative) block eﬀects is important to this ﬁnding. Of the 22 households mortgaging
in, 16 were residents of Titlagarh and Kesinga blocks, with the remaining 6 households
spread over the other three. In the absence of block dummies as controls, the coef-
ﬁcient of land mortgaged in is both smaller and no longer statistically signiﬁcant at
conventional levels.
Where the other endowments are concerned, larger families in 2001 are associated
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with larger ownership holdings in 2013. There is, however, something of a surprise:
controlling for all these factors, families with many adult men in 2001 have less land
in 2013. Perhaps India’s growing urban sector oﬀered them better opportunities.
(Table 5 about here)
7 Conclusions
The usufruct mortgage oﬀers some clear advantages over other forms of contracts in
risky environments when insurance and credit markets are very imperfect, if at all
present. These advantages are, however, double-edged in some respects. When mort-
gaging out a parcel of land, the borrower obtains a goodly sum to deal with an im-
mediate need and can choose when to repay the loan; but future events may well turn
out so adversely that he never does so. For his part, the lender enjoys the user rights
until the loan is repaid in full, an action over whose timing he has no control; but there
is always the possibility – and hope – that the borrower will eventually decide that
repayment will be simply too painful and agree to a transfer of ownership, perhaps
with the inducement of an additional payment. The theoretical framework developed
and analyzed in this paper contains all these elements and yields some results concern-
ing what conditions and factors govern the decision to contract in the ﬁrst place and,
subsequently, when and whether to repay or agree to a sale.
The situation on the ground, in upland Orissa, illustrates and substantially bears
out these ﬁndings. By deﬁnition, a household must own land in the ﬁrst place to be
able to mortgage out land and thus obtain a loan so secured. The chief pressing need
is to marry oﬀ a daughter, but those arising from serious ill-health and bad harvests
are also important. Many of the households that mortgaged out in the early period
had smaller ownership holdings at the close, and the losses were substantial, though
none became landless. Those households that mortgaged in were mostly land-poor at
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the outset, though evidently able to raise the money needed to oﬀer the required loan.
They may indeed have had an opportunistic motive, as this group had accumulated
land ten years later. In this connection, it is notable that of the 10 landless families
that were mortgaging in at the outset, six had become landowners by 2013.
Almost 20 percent of the households in the sample had extant mortgage contracts
in 2013, and complementing this strong level of activity, all the sums involved were
quite large. These facts indicate that such contracts expand households’ opportunities
beyond those oﬀered by the standard informal and formal credit transactions in which
they also engaged. Mortgage contracts also appear to operate as a mechanism that
frequently leads to the full transfer of ownership rights from relatively land-rich to
land-poor households. There are, of course, other processes aﬀecting the distribution
of land, especially the splitting of holdings among brothers. In the villages surveyed,
however, the overall distribution of ownership holdings has remained largely unchanged
over time.
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The uniqueness of yr.
Deﬁne ξ(yr, m) ≡ u(yr)−u(yr−m). Since u is strictly concave, ξ is positive, decreasing,
continuous and strictly convex for all yr, with lim yr→∞ ξ = 0.
Now consider Qmi , which is clearly continuous in y
r. Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. yr, we
obtain
∂Qmi
∂yr
=
δ[Qmi + u
′(yr −m)− u′(yr)] · F ′(yr;μ)
(1− δ(1− πi))2 > 0 ∀y
r ∈ (y1(μ), y2(μ)).
(i) If ξ(y1(μ), m) < δQmi (y
1(μ), m, μ), then ξ and δQmi will not intersect in the interval
[y1(μ), y2(μ)], and the loan will be repaid for certain in the next period.
(ii) If ξ(y1(μ), m) > δQmi (y
1(μ), m, μ) and ξ(y2, m) < δQmi (y
2, m, μ), then ξ and δQmi
will intersect exactly once, at yr, in the interval [y1(μ), y2(μ)].
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(iii) If ξ(y2(μ), m) > Qmi (y
2(μ), m, μ), then ξ and δQmi will not intersect in the interval
[y1(μ), y2(μ)] and the loan will never be repaid.
Turning to the behaviour of the trigger value yr in relation to loan size m, diﬀeren-
tiating (4) totally, holding μ constant, collecting terms and rearranging, we have
(
u′(yr −m)− u′(yr) + ∂Q
m
i
∂yr
)
dyr =
⎛
⎜⎝u′(yr −m)− δ
1− δ(1− πi)
y2(μ)∫
yr
u′(y −m)dF (·;μ)
⎞
⎟⎠dm.
It is seen that the expression multiplying dyr is positive. That multiplying dm is also
positive iﬀ
(1− δ)u′(yr) + δu′(yr −m)
y2(μ)∫
yr
dF (·;μ) > δ
y2(μ)∫
yr
u′(y −m)dF (·;μ),
which certainly holds in virtue of the strict concavity of u. It follows that yr is increasing
in m.
Analogously, yr is decreasing in μ iﬀ ∂Qmi /∂μ > 0. We have
∂Qmi
∂μ
=
1
1− δ(1− πi)
(
Qmi
∂F (yr;μ)
∂μ
− ∂Γ
∂μ
)
.
It follows from Assumption 1 that ∂F (yr;μ)/∂μ > 0 ∀yr ∈ (y1, y2) and is zero oth-
erwise. Γ is the expected utility of the lottery Y (μ > 0) with optimal repayment
behaviour. It is surely decreasing in μ; for the usufructuary holding becomes smaller
and the resulting F is ﬁrst-order stochastically dominated. Thus, yr is decreasing in
μ.
The same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to changes in the endowment λ with
μ constant: yr is increasing in λ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. The trigger value now relates to the variate Yt, but with
each realisation augmented by ai, so that ξ ≡ u(yr + ai)− u(yr + ai −m). We have
∂ξ
∂ai
= u′(yr + ai)− u′(yr + ai −m) < 0.
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The response of Qmi (ai) to changes in ai, holding y
r constant, is
∂Qmi (ai)
∂ai
=
Ω′(Y (0) + ai)−
yr∫
y1(μ)
u′(y + ai)dF (y;μ)−
y2(μ)∫
yr
u′(y + ai −m)dF (y;μ)
1− δi(1− πi) < 0,
since F (y; 0) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F (y;μ) when μ > 0. Hence, yr is
increasing in ai if, and only if, δi · ∂Qmi /∂ai − ∂ξ/∂ai < 0, which condition may be
written as (13):
δi(Γ
′ − Ω′(Y (0) + ai)) > (1− δi(1− πi))[u′(yr + ai −m)− u′(yr + ai)].
The partial derivative of the l.h.s. w.r.t. yr is −δi[u′(yr+ai−m)−u′(yr+ai)]F ′(yr;μ).
The corresponding expression for the r.h.s. is
−δi[u′(yr+ai−m)−u′(yr+ai)]F ′(yr;μ)+(1−δi(1−πi))[u′′(yr+ai−m)−u′′(yr+ai)];
so that the r.h.s. of (13) is decreasing more strongly in yr than the l.h.s. if, and only
if, [u′′(yr + ai −m)− u′′(yr + ai)] < 0, and this holds in turn if u′′′ > 0. Q.E.D.
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Table 1. Mortgage contracts per village in 2013 
contracts villages hh villages
0 9 0 9 
1 6 1 8 
2 4 2 3 
3 4 3 7 
4 4 4 2 
5 1 5 1 
6 2   
59 30 48 30 
 
  
Table 2. Mortgage contracts in the panel 
 2001-04 
(N=240) 
 2013 
(N=216) 
 
(N=279) 
   
 Households 
(N=51) 
Contracts 
(N=60) 
Original 
hh (N=47) 
Households 
(N=51) 
Contracts 
(N=59) 
Mort-in 
2001-04 
Mort-out 
2001-04 
Mortgage-in 24 30 25 29 33 7 2 
Mortgage-out 28 30 24 24 26 (1) 7 
The sample of 279 households in 2013 are the 216 + 59 splits from those households + four households added in 2009. 
  
Table 3. Landholdings (acre) for sub-groups according to mortgage status in 2013 
Group: N landless (%) 25-percentile median mean 75-percentile 
Original sample:       
Mortgage in 33 15 0.5 1.0 1.4* 
(0.8-2) 
2.1 
and matched 17 12 0.5 1.0 1.4 
(0.5-2.2) 
2.0 
Mortgage out 25 0 1.4 2.8 3.4** 
(2.2-4.7) 
5.0 
and matched 15 0 1.0 2.0 3.0 
(1.5-4.5) 
4.5 
No mortgage (ref) 223 21 0.5 1.3 2.0 
(1.6-2.4) 
3.0 
Linked sample:       
Match and mort-in 17 24 0.5 1.0 1.1** 
(0.5-1.7) 
1.9 
Match and mort-out 18 0 2.5 4.0 5.1*** 
(3.0-7.2) 
6.0 
Significantly different from reference category at ** 5%-level, * 10%-level. 
95-% confidence interval in parenthesis. 
  
Table 4. Mortgage decisions: contractual status in 2001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS oprobit mlogit mlogit 
VARIABLES mort-in mort-out mortgage mort-in mort-out 
acres - 0.046* 0.073*** 0.061*** - 0.034 0.070*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.020) (0.032) (0.021) 
acres-sq 0.002 - 0.004 - 0.003* 0.000 - 0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
scheduled tribe - 0.012 - 0.116** - 0.051 - 0.014 - 0.121** 
 (0.036) (0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.058) 
education-head 0.015* - 0.006 - 0.010 0.014** - 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
family-size 0.014 - 0.020 - 0.016 0.012 - 0.016 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) 
workagefem - 0.018 0.041 0.028 - 0.027 0.032 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) 
workagemale 0.007 - 0.038 - 0.022 0.015 - 0.035 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) 
Observations 214 214 214 214 214 
R-squared 0.101 0.131 0.093 0.179 0.179 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold if familysize+workagemale is significant (column 5: significant at 12%-level). 
Cluster-adjusted standard errors in parentheses. Block-dummies included. Marginal effects. 
  
Table 5. Land accumulation 
 OLS OLS OLS 
variables acres13 acres13 acres13 
acres01 0.689*** 0.677*** 0.683***
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.080) 
acres01-mortgaged-in 0.261*** 0.234*** 0.218***
 (0.091) (0.081) (0.076) 
acres01-mortaged-out 0.281 0.360 0.330 
 (0.404) (0.364) (0.371) 
scheduled tribe 0.459(*) 0.359  
 (0.273) (0.287)  
education-head - 0.012   
 (0.028)   
family-size 0.225**   
 (0.083)   
workagefem 0.263   
 (0.182)   
workagemale - 0.625***   
 (0.150)   
Observations 214 214 214 
R-squared 0.534 0.478 0.472 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bold if familysize+workage is significant. 
Cluster-adjusted standard errors in parentheses. Block-dummies included. Marginal effects. 
 
 
 
